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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 900303-CA

v.
Category No. 2

RODNEY DONALD CARTER,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a
controlled substance with the intent to distribute, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv)
(1990), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, presiding.

This Court

has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3(2)(f) (1990).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD
OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court
correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence, ruling
that defendant knowingly and voluntarily consented to the search
of his person and luggage until police officers had reasonable
and articulable suspicion that defendant was involved in a crime.
Because of the trial court's advantageous position in determining
the factual basis for a motion to suppress, this Court will not
reverse the trial court's factual evaluation unless its findings

are clearly erroneous*

State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah

Ct. App.), cert, granted,

P.2d

(Utah 1989).

However, in

assessing the trial court's legal conclusions based upon its
factual findings, this Court applies a correction of error
standard.

Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

U.S. Const. Amend. IVx
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Rodney Carter, was charged with possession
of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv)
(1990) (R. 6). Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence
seized after a warrantless search of his person (R. 24). Upon
the trial court's denial of defendant's motion, defendant entered
a plea of not guilty.

Defendant was convicted on March 20, 1990

after a bench trial and on May 6, 1990, was sentenced to a term
of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.

The sentence

was suspended in lieu of thirty-six months probation under the
supervision of Adult Probation and Parole (R. 130, 142).

o

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On July 17, 1989 Detective Bart Palmer of the Salt Lake
County Sheriff's Office and Lieutenant David Fullmer of the Utah
State Narcotics Agency were observing airline passengers at the
Salt Lake International Airport in an effort to locate drug
couriers (transcript of October 18, 1989 deposition of Detective
Palmer, page 1 [hereinafter "PT."]; transcript of October 18,
1989 deposition of Lieutenant Fullmer, page 1 [hereinafter
"FT."]; and transcript of November 11, 1989 hearing on
defendant's motion to suppress evidence, pages 36-37, 57
2
[hereinafter "Tr."]).
At approximately 5:15 p.m. Palmer and Fullmer were both
observing passengers as they deplaned from an America West flight
originating in Los Angeles and arriving in Salt Lake City via Las
Vegas (Tr. 4, 37, 67; PT, 1), Defendant Rodney Carter was among
the passengers on that plane and was carrying a duffle bag (Tr.
7, 43; PT. 14-15).

As defendant deplaned and entered the

concourse, both officers noted that he scanned the area and crowd
but did not appear to be looking for anyone in particular or
reading the signs for directions (Tr. 38; PT. 1; FT. 1).
Defendant then turned and walked up the concourse, past a bank of
pay telephones (Tr. 41). As defendant walked up the concourse,

Although the State will summarize the facts as attested to by
the testimonies of all witnesses, defendant does not challenge
any of the trial court's findings of fact, in which, inter alia,
the court found the police officers' testimonies more credible
than defendant's testimony.
2
The transcribed depositions of Fullmer and Palmer were made
part of the record by stipulation (Tr. 3; R. 122).

he looked back over his shoulder in the direction of the officers
three times (Tr. 38-39; PT. 1; FT. 1). Both Fullmer and Palmer
decided to continue observing defendant, but they briefly lost
visual contact with him as he rounded a turn (Tr. 39).
Defendant then went to a bank of pay telephones at the
top of the concourse.

Fullmer walked past defendant toward an

escalator, and Palmer went to the telephone cubicle next to
defendant (Tr. 39, 67-68; PT. 1-2; FT. 2-3). Defendant was in
the telephone area only momentarily, and neither officer could
hear him speak to anyone (Tr. 40, 68; PT. 10-11).

Defendant

apparently tried unsuccessfully to call his wife (Tr. 6, 40, 69).
After hanging up the phone, defendant walked to the
terminal escalator leading to the lower level (Tr. 7, 40; PT. 2;
FT. 4). Once defendant was on the escalator, he quickened his
pace and began to rapidly walk past other people (Tr. 40; PT. 2;
FT. 4). Defendant continued to walk at a fast pace and quickly
exited the terminal without stopping by the baggage claim area
(Id.).

Palmer had to run in order to keep pace with defendant,

who exited the terminal and went to the taxi cab stand just
outside the main terminal doors (Tr. 7, 40, 42; PT. 2). Palmer
and Fullmer conferred briefly as they approached the terminal
doors and determined that they wanted to "contact" defendant
3
before he left the premises (FT. 5-7). Fullmer went out the
northern doors of the terminal, and Palmer went out the doors

Fullmer explained at the hearing that when an individual is
"contacted," the officer merely asks "permission to discuss
things with the individual, and they have to agree" before the
officer continues the discussion (Tr. 92).

through which defendant had exited (FT. 6).
Palmer approached defendant as he was preparing to
board a taxi, identified himself as a police officer and asked
defendant if he "would mind talking" to him for a moment (Tr. 44,
98; PT. 2, 17, 18). Defendant responded, M[s]ure," and removed
his bag from the back seat of the taxi (Tr. 8-9, 44). Palmer
asked defendant if he could see his plane ticket (Tr. 9-10; PT.
2, 19). Defendant responded that he thought he had left his
ticket on the airplane but looked in his carry-on bag and
produced an old America West ticket dated July 15, 1989 (Tr. 10,
43; PT. 2, 19-20).

Defendant handed the ticket to Palmer, who,

after noting it was under the name "Warren Carter," handed it
back to defendant (Tr. 52; PT. 2, 19-20).
At about that point, Fullmer arrived near the scene and
could see Palmer and defendant standing near the open back door
of the taxi cab (Tr. 69; FT. 7). As Fullmer approached, the two
stepped away from the cab, and Palmer asked defendant if he had
any identification.

Defendant responded that he did not, and

Palmer asked him to look in his bag to see if he had anything
with his name on it

(Tr. 43, 52, 69-70, 85; FT. 8-9; PT. 2, 20).

Defendant then turned and put his bag on a bench that was
adjacent to the cab stand (Tr. 46, 70, 85-86; FT. 10; PT. 2, 20).
As defendant bent over his bag to look through it,
Fullmer noted that there was a "line" protruding through
defendant's shirt (Tr. 70-1, 86; FT. 10). The line was above
defendant's waist and spanned across his back (.Id.)-

Although

Fullmer testified that he "definitely didn't know exactly what it

was," he was concerned that the line was tape which he had seen
used on numerous occasions to strap narcotics to people's
midsections (LdL).
Palmer then told defendant that he was a narcotics
agent and asked defendant if he was carrying any drugs.
Defendant responded that he was not (Tr. 9, 98-99; PT. 2, 21).
Palmer then asked defendant if he could search his bag, and
defendant indicated that he could (Tr. 9, 26, 45-6, 71, 88-9; FT.
10-11; PT. 2-3, 22). Palmer told the defendant that "it was
strictly up to him," and that the defendant did not have to let
him search his bag (Tr. 46, 65, 72, 88; PT. 3, 22). Defendant
responded, "[y]es, you can," and handed his bag to Palmer (Id.
4
and Tr. 26).
Palmer began to search defendant's bag.

Fullmer

testified that he then asked defendant if he "would mind" if
Fullmer searched his person (Tr. 47, 64, 72; FT. 11; PT. 3).
Defendant responded, "go ahead," and turned his back to Fullmer
(Tr. 48, 72; FT. 11; PT. 3). Defendant testified, however, that
Fullmer did not ask to search his person.

According to

defendant, Fullmer simply stated that he was going to search him,
moved behind defendant and began a pat down search.

Defendant

further indicated that he did not say anything but just "went
along with it" (Tr. 12-14, 27-8).
4
Although defendant testified that Palmer asked if he could
search his bag and that he responded "Yes, you can," he also
testified that he did not recall Palmer telling him that he did
not have to allow him to search his bag (Tr. 26). Defendant
further testified that Palmer "could have" told him, and that he
was "not going to deny" that Palmer told him about his right to
refuse consent (Id..).

Fullmer conducted a pat down search of defendant and
detected two bulges in defendant's lower abdomen area which later
proved to be packages containing approximately 453 grams of
cocaine (Tr. 73, 78; FT. 11-13)•

According to Fullmer, after he

completed the pat down search he pointed to defendant's abdomen
where the bulges were and asked defendant what they were (Tr. 734; FT. 13). Defendant did not respond, and Fullmer then asked if
he could see the bulges (Tr. 74; FT. 13). Fullmer testified that
defendant again did not respond verbally, and both officers
testified that defendant then raised his shirt and revealed
masking tape strapped around his midsection (Tr. 46-7, 74-5; FT.
13-4; PT. 3).
Fullmer still could not see the bulges, and asked
defendant the purpose of the tape (Tr. 75; FT. 14). Defendant
responded that he had injured his ribs and had taped them (Tr.
15, 29, 75; FT. 14). The tape was well below defendant's ribs,
started at his waistline and continued into his pants (Tr. 75;
FT. 14-15; PT. 3). Fullmer testified that he then asked
defendant if he could see the rest of the tape, and defendant
responded that he could but said he would rather not do so in the
public area of the terminal (Tr. 75; FT. 14-15).

Fullmer said

that their airport office was just inside the doors and suggested
that they could go there if that was all right with defendant.
Defendant said, "yes," and the three proceeded to the office (Tr.
75; FT. 15).
Palmer was just completing the search of defendant's
bag when Fullmer informed him that they were going to the airport

office (Tr. 48). According to defendant, Palmer's search of his
bag took only "[t]hree, four minutes.
long at all" (Tr. 10-11).

Something like that. Not

Fullmer's pat down search of defendant

was initiated almost immediately after Palmer began searching
defendant's bag and was completed shortly before Palmer was
finished (Tr. 48, 72).
Fullmer testified that, upon entering the airport
office, he pointed to a seat and said to defendant "you can sit
there if you like" (Tr. 77-8; FT. 17). According to both
officers, defendant remained standing and said "you've got me,
you might as well have this" (Tr. 77-8; FT. 17; PT. 24).
Defendant then opened his pants to reveal the tape and two
packages near his lower abdomen (Td. ) . Fullmer asked if there
was cocaine in the packages, and defendant indicated that there
was.

Fullmer and defendant then removed the tape and packages.

Fullmer tested the material and confirmed that it was cocaine
(Tr. 78; FT. 17).
Defendant was arrested and informed of his rights
pursuant to Miranda (Tr. 79; FT. 17; PT. 24). According to
Fullmer and Palmer, defendant then told them that he thought they
were police when he got off the plane, and that was why he kept
5
looking back toward them (Tr. 50-1, 79; FT. 17; PT. 24).
Defendant's testimony about how he was taken to the
airport office differs somewhat from that of the officers.
According to defendant, he simply did not respond to Fullmer's
5
Defendant testified that he made no such statement and that he
did not know he was being followed until Palmer approached him
near the taxi cab (Tr. 22-23).
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requests to see the tape or bulges and never raised his shirt.
He did, however, testify that he told Fullmer and Palmer that he
had injured his ribs playing ball and had taped them.

According

to defendant's testimony, both officers laughed and told him they
were going to their office.

Defendant testified that once in the

office Fullmer immediately grabbed his shirt and raised it to
reveal the tape strapped to defendant's body (Tr. 14-15, 28-31).
Defendant further testified that after the officers had seen the
tape, Fullmer again asked what the bulge was and defendant said
something to the effect of M[y]ou have got it," or "here it is,"
apparently in reference to the cocaine (Tr. 19, 31).
In denying defendant's motion to suppress the cocaine
seized, the trial court issued detailed written findings of fact
and conclusions of law.

(A copy of the district court's Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law is attached hereto as Addendum A ) .
The trial court specifically found that "defendant freely and
voluntarily consented to the police requests at least through the
point of his voluntarily raising his shirt and disclosing to the
police the masking tape that was bound around the trunk of his
body" (R. 121). The court also found that the "tape was of the
type not normally used for medical purposes and was located below
the rib cage which was the area of injury indicated by defendant"
(Id.).

After noting that it had read transcripts of the

officers' earlier depositions and had listened to the testimonies
of both the officers and defendant, the trial court said it was
"confident in crediting the testimony of the officers in this
case" (R. 122).

The court concluded that "defendant freely and
voluntarily consented to everything that went on, at least
through the point of voluntarily raising his shirt and disclosing
to the police what was around the trunk of his body" (R. 123).
The court also specifically concluded that "the pat down search
[of defendant] was a free and voluntary consensual search" (Id.).
Finally, the court concluded that defendant's lack of
identification under the circumstances and his having non-medical
type tape strapped around his abdomen for purported rib injuries,
"gave rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion that the
defendant was involved in crime, and therefore, from that point
forward, law enforcement personnel were able to or had a right to
interfere with the defendant's liberty" (R. 123-24).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to
suppress because the defendant knowingly and voluntarily
consented to the search of his person and luggage.

Further,

defendant voluntarily raised his shirt and revealed to officers
that he had non-medical masking tape wrapped around his waist for
purported rib injuries.

Defendant's lack of identification under

the circumstances combined with his having masking tape wrapped
around his waist gave rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity and justified detention of defendant from that point
forward.

Moreover, defendant voluntarily produced the cocaine

that was in his possession, and its subsequent seizure was
legally justified.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED BY THE
POLICE BECAUSE DEFENDANT VOLUNTARILY
CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH THAT YIELDED
CONTRABAND UNTIL THE POLICE HAD A REASONABLE
ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT DEFENDANT WAS
INVOLVED IN A CRIME, AT WHICH TIME THE POLICE
HAD THE RIGHT TO INTERFERE WITH DEFENDANT'S
LIBERTY.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress evidence.

In reviewing the trial court's

ruling, this Court applies the following standard:
In considering the trial court's action in
denying defendant's motion to suppress, we
will not disturb its factual evaluation
unless its findings are clearly erroneous. .
. . The trial judge is in the best position
to assess the credibility and accuracy of the
witnesses' divergent testimonies. . . .
However, in assessing the trial court's legal
conclusions based upon its factual findings,
we afford it no deference but apply a
"correction of error" standard.
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.), cert.
granted,

P.2d

(Utah 1989) (citations omitted).

Defendant claims that his rights under the fourth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution were violated,
arguing that the police did not have a reasonable and articulable
suspicion to stop defendant and that defendant did not
voluntarily consent to a search.
Although defendant purports to base his claim on both federal
and state constitutional grounds, he does not offer a specific
independent state analysis. Rather, he merely makes a conclusory
statement to the effect that "the Utah Supreme Court has
abandoned 'tailgating' United States Supreme Court cases" and

It is well settled that police officers may approach
citizens and initiate a consensual encounter, and, as long as
there is no detention or seizure, no fourth amendment rights are
implicated,

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983); State v.

Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, (Utah 1987) State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d
85, (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

While defendant acknowledges that

police officers may initiate consensual encounters, he asserts
that "what began as a 'consensual' encounter in the instant case
quickly escalated into a fourth amendment detention or seizure"
(Br. of App. at 8). The facts of this case and applicable case
law do not support that assertion, and defendant's claim should
be rejected.

Cont. suggests that this Court's decision in State v. Sery,
758 P.2d 935"(Utah Ct. App. 1988), should control this case (Br.
of App. at 18 n.2).
A mere assertion that a state and federal analysis might
differ, without any elaboration, does not constitute a reasoned
analysis. Defendant's state constitutional analysis below was
even more cursory than that presented in his brief. This Court,
therefore, should address defendant's claim based only on federal
constitutional provisions. See, e.g., State v. Julian, 771 P.2d
1061, 1062 n,l (Utah 1989); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 883
n.4 (Utah Ct. App.), petition for cert, filed, 135 Utah Adv. Rep.
78 (Utah 1990) .
Even if this Court were to consider defendant's state
constitutional claim, defendant's reliance on Sery for his broad
assertion is misplaced. Sery was not decided under state
constitutional provisions, but under federal constitutional
provisions. Furthermore, the aspect of Sery which defendant
appears to argue is applicable to this case was based at least in
part on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in United
States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413 (9th Cir. 1987). See Sery, 758
P.2d at 943-44. The United States Supreme Court has since
reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision in Sokolow. United States
v. Sokolow, 109 S.Ct. 1581 (1989). Consequently, whether that
portion of Sery upon which defendant seems to rely is still
viable law is unclear.
-12-

Utah courts have recognized three levels of police
encounters with the public:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as
the citizen is not detained against his will;
(2) an officer may seize a person if the
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that
the person has committed or is about to
commit a crime; however, the "detention must
be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop";
(3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the
officer has probable cause to believe an
offense has been committed or is being
committed.
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (quoting
United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984)).
See also State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d at 328; State v. Smith, 781
P.2d 879, 881 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Defendant mischaracterizes

his encounter with officers Fullmer and Palmer as a "level two
encounter" requiring "articulable suspicion" when it was in fact
a consensual encounter, at least until the point at which the
7
officers and he moved to the airport office.
In making his
Defendant argues that even though he agreed to speak with
Palmer, the encounter lost its consensual nature "when Palmer
persisted in questioning him after he had been unable to produce
his current ticket and had already provided a prior ticket" (Br.
of App. at 11). Not only does defendant fail to cite any
authority for this argument, but under level one consensual
encounters, officers may "pose questions so long as the citizen
is not detained against his will." Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617.
Defendant also argues that "[c]onsensual type encounters
clearly lose their voluntary nature when police begin searching"
and appears to claim that once Palmer began searching defendant's
bag defendant was seized (Br. of App. at 11). Defendant again
fails to cite any authority for his per se argument, and the
state is aware of none. More importantly, defendant's argument
is the product of an inappropriate intermingling of the questions

argument, defendant relies primarily on State v. Sery, 758 P.2d
935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), and Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491
(1983).

However, Sery and Royer are significantly different from

the instant case.
In Sery, after the defendant refused to consent to a
search of his bag, he was told he was free to leave, which he
did.

Detectives then gathered more information and again

approached the defendant.

When the defendant refused to submit

his bag to a drug detection dog sniff, the officers detained him
and seized his bag.

The defendant was seized when he and his bag

were taken back inside the airport terminal.

This Court held

that the officers lacked a reasonable suspicion to justify
seizing and detaining defendant.

Similarly, the defendant in

Royer was seized when the detectives, without returning his
ticket and driver's license, asked him to accompany them to a
small room some 40 feet away.

The seizure of the defendant was

not justified because the detectives lacked reasonable suspicion
that he was involved in criminal activity.

In both Sery and

Royer, the defendants' freedom of movement was clearly restricted
by the actions of the officers even though the officers did not
possess the requisite reasonable and articulable suspicion of
criminal activity.
The instant case presents a situation very different
from Sery and Royer because, as the trial court found, defendant

Cont. of whether consent was voluntary and whether defendant
was seized; the two questions require distinct analysis. See,
e.g., United States v. Maragh, 894 F.2d 415, 420 (D.C. Cir.
1990).
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freely and voluntarily consented to everything that occurred, at
least until he voluntarily raised his shirt (R. 123). Numerous
courts, when faced with police-citizen encounters similar to the
encounter in the instant case, have found that defendants were
not seized and fourth amendment protections were not triggered.
See, e.g., United States v. Maragh, 894 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(holding that defendant was not seized for fourth amendment
purposes during encounter at train station in which officer
approached defendant without blocking his path, while another
officer stood behind defendant, and officer identified himself as
a narcotics officer, asked defendant if he had drugs in his bag,
and defendant allowed officer to search bag); United States v.
Poitier, 818 F.2d 679, 682 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that more was
required to turn consensual questioning of passenger at airport
into level two encounter than display of badges, request for
information and suggestion that the parties move to a nearby area
out of the flow of traffic).
Moreover, defendant does not challenge any of the trial
court's specific findings of fact, including the trial court's
findings governing voluntary consent.

For the purposes of legal

analysis, the State and this Court must rely on the correctness
of these findings of fact.

Defendant, by rearguing his motion to

suppress, is asking this Court to assume the trial bench and
exercise a de novo review of the evidence presented at the
hearing on that motion.

That is not the function of the

appellate process, and defendant's arguments must be rejected.
Even if this Court were to exercise such a review, the law
clearly supports the trial court's finding of voluntary consent.

As the United States Supreme Court said in Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), it is "well settled that one
of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of
both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted
pursuant to [valid] consent."

Ixi. at 219 (citations omitted).

For consent to be valid it must be freely and voluntarily given.
Id. at 222. This Court has likewise recognized the voluntary
consent exception to fourth amendment requirements.

See State v.

Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 887 (Utah Ct. App,), petition for cert,
filed, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 78 (Utah 1990);
P.2d 972, 980 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

State v. Sierra, 754

To determine whether consent

to search was voluntary, a totality of the circumstances test is
applied to ensure that the consent was in fact voluntary and not
the result of "duress or coercion, express or implied."
Marshall, 791 P.2d at 887 (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227).
The issue of whether a defendant voluntarily consented is a
question of fact on which the state carries the burden of proof.
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557 (1980);
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222, 227.
P.2d 65, 87 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

See also State v. Webb, 790
This Court deferentially

reviews trial court's finding that defendant's consent was
voluntarily given and will not reverse absent clear error. Webb,
790 P.2d at 87.
While this Court has made clear that the state has the
burden of demonstrating voluntary consent, it has not clearly
specified what standard of proof applies to that burden.

In

State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d at 887-88, and State v. Webb, 790
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P.2d at 82, the Court appears to have adopted a clear and
convincing standard of proof by embracing the standard espoused
in United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1976).
Quoting Abbott, the Marshall Court set out the following standard
which must be met by the state "to sustain its burden to show
that voluntary consent was given":
(1) There must be clear and positive
testimony that the consent was "unequivocal
and specific" and "freely and intelligently
given"; (2) the government must prove consent
was given without duress or coercion, express
or implied; and (3) the courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against the waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights and there
must be convincing evidence that such rights
were waived.
791 P.2d at 887-88 (quoting Abbott, 546 F.2d at 885 (quoting
Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680, 684 (10th Cir. 1962)).
This standard has been questioned by at least one other court as
being an unduly strict standard of proof.

United States v. -

Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1130-31 (1st Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 440
U.S. 958 (1979).

Indeed, insofar as the Abbott standard imposes

a clear and convincing standard of proof on the government, it is
contrary to the clear majority view that the government need only
prove voluntary consent to search by a preponderance of the
evidence.

See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177

n.14 (1974) (where, in reviewing the voluntariness of a consent
to a warrantless search, the Court said the "controlling burden
of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden
than proof by a preponderance of the evidence"); Bourjaily v.
United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176 (1987) (citing Matlock for the
principle that "voluntariness of consent to search must be shown

by a preponderance of the evidence"); United States v. Hurtado,
905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Chaidez, 906 F.2d
377 (8th Cir. 1990); White Fabricating Company v. United States,
903 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1990); People v. Harris, 557 N.E.2d 1277
(111. App. 1990); State v. Cross, 576 A.2d 1366 (Me. 1990); State
v. O'Dell, 576 A.2d 425 (R.I. 1990); People v. Henderson, 220
Cal.App.3d 1632f 270 Cal.Rptr. 248 (1990).
While acceptance of the preponderance standard in this
context is not universal, see 4 LaFavef Search and Seizure,
§ 11.2(c) at 236-37 (1987), the United States Supreme Court has
made clear that that standard is appropriate, thus explaining the
majority view.

As the Fifth Circuit said in overruling its prior

decisions that adopted a clear and convincing standard of proof:
Since 1972, the Supreme Court has stated
that the preponderance of evidence standard
supplies the burden which the government must
carry to defeat a defendant's motion to
suppress evidence when the motion concerns
the voluntariness of a confession, Lego v.
Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 482-89, 92 S.Ct. 619,
623-26, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972), the
voluntariness of a consent to a warrantless
search, United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S.
164, 177 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 988, 996 n. 14, 39
L.Ed.2d 242 (1974), the inevitable discovery
of evidence, Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,
444 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2509 n. 5, 81
L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), or the waiver of Miranda
rights, Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157,
107 S.Ct. 515, 523, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986).
In conformity with the rationale announced
by the Supreme Court, we overrule our
previous decisions requiring the government
at a suppression hearing to prove
voluntariness [of consent to search] by clear
and convincing evidence. "[TJhe controlling
burden of proof at suppression hearings
should impose no greater burden than proof by
a preponderance of the evidence." United
States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n. 14,
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94 S.Ct. 988, 996 n. 14, 39 L.Ed.2d 242
(1974).
United States v. Hurtado# 905 F.2d at 76.

In Lego v. Twomey, the

Supreme Court explained its rationale for the preponderance
standard:
Since the purpose that a voluntariness
hearing is designed to serve has nothing
whatever to do with improving the reliability
of jury verdicts, we cannot accept the charge
that judging the admissibility of a
confession by a preponderance of the evidence
undermines the mandate of In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368
(1970). Our decision in Winship was not
concerned with the standards for determining
the admissibility of evidence or with the
prosecution's burden of proof at a
suppression hearing when evidence is
challenged on constitutional grounds.
Winship went no further than to confirm the
fundamental right that protects "the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is
charged." Id. at 364, 90 S.Ct., at 1072. . .
. A guilty verdict is not rendered less
reliable or less consonant with Winship
simply because the admissibility of a
confession is determined by a less stringent
standard. . . .
404 U.S. at 486-87.

The Court also rejected the argument that

the admissibility of evidence challenged on constitutional
grounds should be determined under a stricter standard of proof
in order to protect the values that exclusionary rules are
designed to protect:
The argument is straightforward and has
appeal. But we are unconvinced that merely
emphasizing the importance of the values
served by exclusionary rules is itself
sufficient demonstration that the
Constitution also requires admissibility to
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment has been excluded from federal

criminal trials for years. The same is true
of coerced confessions offered in federal or
state trials. But, from our experience over
this period of time no substantial evidence
has accumulated that federal rights have
suffered from determining admissibility by a
preponderance of the evidence. . . . Without
good cause, we are unwilling to expand
currently applicable exclusionary rules by
erecting additional barriers to placing
truthful and probative evidence before state
juries . . . .
Sound reason for moving
further in this direction has not been
offered here nor do we discern any at the
present time. This is particularly true
since the exclusionary rules are very much
aimed at deterring lawless conduct by the
police and prosecution and it is very
doubtful that escalating the prosecution's
burden of proof in Fourth and Fifth Amendment
suppression hearings would be sufficiently
productive in this respect to outweigh the
public interest in placing probative evidence
before juries for the purpose of arriving at
truthful decisions about guilt or innocence.
404 U.S. at 488-89 (citations and footnote omitted).

Although

the Court said that "the States are free,pursuant to their own
law, to adopt a higher standardf,] [in that] [t]hey may indeed
differ as to the appropriate resolution of the values they find
at stake," Ld* at 489, the rationale of Lego v. Twomey is sound
and should provide the basis for this Court clearly specifying
that the state need only prove voluntary consent to search by a
preponderance of the evidence.
Defendant claims that his consent could not have been
voluntary because it was not "unequivocal and specific" (Br. of
App. at 23).

As a brief review of the record will demonstrate,

that assertion is utterly meritless.
Palmer identified himself as a narcotics officer before
he asked defendant if he could search his bag.
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When defendant

responded that he could, Palmer emphasized that it was strictly
up to defendant to allow him to search his bag (Tr. 46, 65, 72,
88; PT. 3, 22). Defendant again responded affirmatively and
handed his bag to Palmer (3x1. and Tr, 26). Just as Palmer began
to search defendant's bag, Fullmer asked defendant if he could
search his person.

Defendant responded, "go ahead," and turned

his back to Fullmer (Tr. 48, 72; FT. 11; PT. 3). The trial court
found that defendant voluntarily raised his shirt to reveal the
masking tape wrapped around the trunk of his body (R. 121, 123).
All of those events occurred in a public area of the
airport, and only a few minutes elapsed.

Neither officer asked

defendant to move to an isolated area of the airport or to their
office.

Indeed, it was defendant who asked if they could move

out of the public eye (Tr. 75; FT. 14-15).

Fullmer suggested

that their office was nearby, and defendant agreed that that
location would be suitable (Tr. 75; PT 15). After the three
entered the office, defendant volunteered that he was carrying
narcotics and admitted that the packages strapped to his abdomen
contained cocaine (Tr. 77-8; FT. 17; PT. 24). Defendant even
assisted Fullmer in removing the tape and packages from his
midsection (Tr. 77-8; FT. 17; PT.24).
The evidence clearly supports the trial court's finding
of voluntary consent to search by a preponderance of the
evidence.

Even if this Court chooses to apply the stiffer

Marshall standard, it is difficult to imagine how defendant's
consent to search could have been more "unequivocal and
specific".

Moreover, defendant does not allege that his consent

was the product of duress or coercion.

Therefore, discussion of

the second prong of the Marshall analysis is unnecessary.
Considering the totality of circumstances, there can be little
doubt that defendant's consent was valid, at least through the
point of his raising his shirt.

See, e.g., Mendenhall, 446 U.S.

at 555-60 (consent to search obtained after defendant had
accompanied officers to an office away from the public eye and
defendant had expressed concern that she would miss her plane was
held valid); United States v. Bell, 892 F.2d 959, 965-66 (10th
Cir. 1989) (finding consent valid under totality of circumstances
with facts very similar to the instant case).

See also State v.

Webb, 790 P.2d at 82-3 (holding that even though defendant had
already been arrested at time consent to search was given, under
the totality of circumstances test consent was valid).
At the time defendant raised his shirt, the cumulative
effect of three factors gave rise to a reasonable articulable
suspicion that defendant was committing a crime: (1) defendant's
lack of identification under the circumstances; (2) the fact that
defendant indicated that the masking tape wrapped around his body
was for rib injuries; and (3) the observation of the police
officers that the tape was located below defendant's rib cage and
was not of the type normally used for medical reasons (R. 123).
All three factors were known to the officers before they
accompanied defendant to the airport office.

Consequently, even

if the encounter between the officers and defendant escalated to
a level two encounter when it was decided to move to an office
inside the airport terminal, the officers were justified in
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detaining defendant from that point forward,
at 617-18.

Deitman, 739 P.2d

The record clearly supports the trial court's finding

to that effect (R. 123-24).
Finally, defendant asserts that State v. Arroyo, 796
P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), is applicable to this case. Arroyo applies
to those cases in which consent is given after there has been
some police misconduct which might have tainted the validity of
that consent.

It is intended to prevent law enforcement

officials from exploiting their prior illegalities to obtain
consent.

In the instant case, there was no illegality on the

part of police before defendant consented to the search of his
person and bag.

Consequently, Arroyo does not apply to this

case, and defendant's reliance on it is misplaced.
The encounter between police and defendant was
consensual, at least until defendant raised his shirt to reveal
the masking tape strapped around his body.

From that point

forward, the officers had a right to detain defendant.

The trial

court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction
should be affirmed.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

Case No. 891901201

v,
RODNEY DONALD CARTER,

Honorable Michael R. Murphy
Defendant.
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy on the 11th day of December,
1989.

The State of Utah was represented by its attorney, GREGORY

M. WARNER, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney, and the defendant was
present

and

represented

ESQUIRE.

The

Court

testimony

presented

by

having
by

the

his

counsel,

duly

considered

parties

RONALD

together

the
with

J.

YENGICH,

evidence
the

and

party's

argument thereon, now makes and enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The defendant deplaned from an airline which the

police considered to be from an area of origin where drugs were
considered available.
2.

As the defendant deplaned, he scanned the crowd.
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Page two

3.

As the defendant proceeded down the corridor, he

looked back at least three times.
4.

The defendant went to a phone bank which was not

the first phone bank

available, but was

the second phone bank

available.
5.

As the defendant was at the phone bank, he looked

away from the police officer who had gone to the telephone next to
the one the defendant was using, and it is the Court's finding that
the officers involved had no ability to actually perceive what the
defendant was doing.
6.
airport

The defendant next proceeded toward the exit of the

and walked

fast down an ^JL-evator^ rsTpner than remaining

stationary.
7.

The defendant was carrying a type of a duffle bag

which appeared to be empty.
8.

The defendant did not have checked bags.

9.

The defendant proceeded directly to a cab stand and

hailed a cab.
10.

The defendant approached the taxi.

He had engaged

the taxi, had placed his bag into the back seat and was contacted
by an officer who told him he was a police officer, and asked the
defendant if he would speak with him.
11.

The defendant was asked to talk to the officer in a

location approximately 20 feet from the taxi, at which point the
officers began to ask the defendant questions.
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12.
enforcement

The defendant was asked for identification by law

personnel

and

the

defendant

was

unable

to

produce

identification.
13.

The

defendant's

duffle

bag

was

searched

and

an

airline ticket used on a previous flight in the name of Warren
Carter was revealed.
14.

Officer Fullmer detected a line just at or above

the defendant's waist but under his outer clothing, but was unable
to determine what material caused

such

line on the defendant's

clothing.
15.

A pat down search was conducted by Officer Fullmer

of the defendant and a bulge or bulges was found on the defendant
at the time of such pat down.
16.

The defendant lifted his shirt and exposed masking

tape which extended down into his pants and which the defendant
indicated to the law enforcement personnel was for medical purposes.
17.

The defendant was

returning

from Nevada

and had

just a day or so before gone from Salt Lake to Las Vegas, which he
demonstrated by the ticket stub that was produced by the defendant.
18.

The

defendant

freely

and

voluntarily

raised

his

shirt exposing the masking tape strapped around his body and the
Court finds that the defendant freely and voluntarily consented to
the police requests at least through the point of his voluntarily
raising his shirt and disclosing to the police the masking^t^ypa ^ that was bound around the trunk of his body. IMC L*~j%^ (
*
/
*
•
*
- **j

c/^
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19.

The Court's determination of the facts was not a

matter of the Court perfunctorily accepting the testimony of the
police officers.
the testimony

The Court listened to both officers testimony and

of

the defendant, and

after

further

reading

the

Transcript in lieu of a preliminary hearing previously submitted by
counsel for the purpose of the hearing, the Court feels confident
in crediting the testimony of the officers in this case.
WHEREFORE,

having

heretofore

entered

its

Findings

of

Fact, the Court now makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The

Court

specifically

discredits

the

officers

ability to form a reasonable articulate suspicion prior to the time
of

the

defendant's

failure

to

provide

an

identification

upon

request.
2.

The Court concludes that the absence or the failure

of the defendant to produce identification also was not by itself,
or in the aggregate with the previously listed factors, sufficient
to indicate a reasonable articulable suspicion.
3.

The

Court

further

concludes

that

the

officer

perception of a line just at or above the defendant's waist, but
under

his

suspicion

outer
by

clothing,

itself

or

The

Court

was

not

a

reasonable

in combination with

anything

articulable
previously

noted.
4.

further

concludes

that

the

pat

down

search and observations made by the officers, including the feeling
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of

the

bulge,

at

that

time was

not

sufficient

to

constitute a

reasonable suspicion either alone or in the aggregate.
5.

The Court

gives no weight

individually

or

in the

aggregate to those factors other than the lack of identification in
conjunction

with

the

lifting

of

the

defendant's

shirt: and

his

explanation as to the tape on his body.
6.
freely

and

least

The

Court

voluntarily

through

the

concludes, however,

consented

point

of

that

to everything

voluntarily

the

defendant

that went

raising

his

on, at

shirt

and

disclosing to the police what was around the trunk of his body and
further

that

the

pat

down

search

was

a

free

and

voluntary

that

a

combination

consensual search.
7.

The

Court

concludes

of

the

defendant's lack of identification under the circumstances where he
was at the airport returning from Nevada and had just a day or so
gone

from

Salt

Lake

to

Las

Vegas,

which

was

demonstrated

voluntarily by the ticket stub that was produced by the defendant,
and

in

raising

combination
his

shirt

with
wherein

the

defendant

the

freely

defendant

stated

and
that

voluntarily
what

was

strapped around his body was merely for medical purposes, and the
observation of the police at that time that the taping was other
than what is normally used in medical settings, and the fact that
the

taping

was

below

the

rib

cage,

gave

rise

to

reasonable

articulable suspicion that the defendant was involved in crime, and
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therefore, from that point forward, law enforcement personnel were
able to or had a right to interfere with the defendant's liberty.
, 4-7%)

DATED this/ '

day of January, 1990.

BY THE COURT:
^^"7
HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY
Third District Court Judge
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